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It is tempting to try to infer the welfare effects of minimum wage changes from empirical
observations on pre- and post change employment and unemployment levels and wage or earnings
distributions. Using a simple model of search, matching, and bargaining, I characterize the relationship
between minimum wage levels, labor market outcomes, and the welfare of labor market participants.
Using observations on wage distributions before and after changes in the nominal minimum wage, I
determine what can and cannot be learned about welfare impacts from changes in various features of
these distributions. Results are illustrated using simulation exercises and a small empirical example.
Using U.S. data for young labor market participants in March 1997 and March 1998, this study concludes
that the increase in the minimum wage which occurred in September 1997 may have been welfare-
enhancing, though various implications of the model are not consistent with the data. This analysis
illustrates the fact that well-specified behavioral models are required to evaluate the impact of changes in




It is tempting to try to infer the welfare eﬀects of actual minimum wage changes from
empirical observations on pre- and post-change employment and unemployment levels and wage
or earnings distributions. For example, minimum wage increases are often explicitly or implicitly
taken to be beneﬁcial for the impacted population if changes in group employment rates are found
to be positive or only slightly negative. As another example, although a very small percentage of
U.S. workers are paid the minimum wage, larger impacts on welfare within the general population
are often taken to result from a sort of “ripple” eﬀect from the bottom up, which in terms of the
wage distribution itself is often referred to as spillover. Empirical evidence that demonstrates a
change in the shape of the wage distribution above the minimum wage is often interpreted as
resulting from these spillover eﬀects, and by their very nature these are assumed to be beneﬁcial
for individuals on the supply side of the market.
In this paper I shall rigorously attempt to rigorously deﬁne, characterize, and explain the
phenomenon of spillover. To accomplish this task, I will use a simple model of search and
bargaining in a stationary environment. While the model is admittedly highly stylized, in a
companion paper (Flinn 1999) I show that it can be estimated using Current Population Survey
(CPS) data and that it ﬁts observed wage and unemployment duration distributions quite well.
Thus the model at a minimum provides a parsimonious and readily interpretable view of the
labor market as it is reﬂected in CPS data, and for this reason can be given some credibility. The
model is readily adapted to allow for the existence of binding minimum wages rates. The
equilibrium which results from the imposition of a minimum wage [or an increase in value of an
1already binding minimum wage] is roughly in accordance with empirical work on this subject
based on disaggregated data. In particular, a few of the implications of the model are: (1) the
existence of a probability mass at the minimum wage m with an absolutely continuous
distribution to the right of m; (2) decreases in employment rates with increases in the minimum
wage; and (3) the possible existence of spillover eﬀects in response to a change in the minimum
wage rate. Using the model, I will rigorously deﬁne a particular welfare measure as well as
“spillovers.”1 I show that welfare in the population can increase even though employment rates
decrease, and with or without “spillovers” in the wage distribution. Conversely, spillover eﬀects of
minimum wage changes do not indicate that the change was necessarily welfare-enhancing. The
main point to which I want to draw attention is that the welfare eﬀects of minimum wage changes
can only be inferred by using empirical evidence on employment rates, wage distributions, and a
formal model within which welfare can be rigorously deﬁned and evaluated.
I will not be directly concerned with the impacts of minimum wage levels on
unemployment or employment levels in this paper. Instead, I will use the model to attempt to
understand the impact of minimum wage levels on accepted wage oﬀer distributions, both in
terms of truncation and shape-changing. Several authors have attempted to adapt standard
econometric models for truncated and limited dependent variables to incorporate minimum wages
into standard wage function estimation schemes. Some of the more important research eﬀorts in
this area include Meyer and Wise (1983a,1983b), Dinardo et al. (1996), and Dickens et al. (1997).
Meyer and Wise estimated a model of minimum wage eﬀects using individual-level data which
allowed them to infer what the wage distribution and employment level would have been in the
1The deﬁnition of spillover we will use turns out to be identical to how the notion is deﬁned in Assumption 1 of
Dinardo et al. (1996). While they utilize an assumption regarding the extent of spillover in the wage distribution to
perform a statistical decomposition of probability density functions, we will be interested in using the deﬁnition to
formulate a nonparametric test for the existence of spillovers.
2absence of a minimum wage. The basic idea behind the econometric speciﬁcation is to assume the
form of the wage distribution in the absence of a minimum wage, and then to allow the minimum
wage to alter this distribution by essentially aggregating probability mass around the minimum
wage to that exact value. This results in a wage distribution which has a continuous and discrete
component to it. Although their model speciﬁcation has been criticized by a number of
researchers [e.g., Card and Krueger (1995, pp. 232-236) and Dickens et al. (1997)], primarily for
relying on functional form assumptions for identiﬁcation and for choosing a parameterization
which rules out the possibility of employment increases in response to a minimum wage increase,
it remains one of the better econometric attempts to identify minimum wage eﬀects using
individual-level data in the literature.2 From my perspective, the main weakness of their model is
the arbitrary speciﬁcation of the manner in which a minimum wage “distorts” the preexisting
distribution wage distribution. In the model developed here and in the companion paper (Flinn
1999), optimizing behavior by searchers and ﬁrms determines the nature of this “distortion,” and
it is roughly consistent both with the Meyer and Wise econometric speciﬁcation and with the
empirical evidence cited in Card and Krueger.
The Dickens et al. paper attempts to compare wage distributions before and after changes
in the minimum wage in order to infer employment eﬀects. To estimate employment impacts,
they replace the Meyer and Wise identiﬁcation condition that the minimum wage has no impact
on the distribution of wages immediately above it with the condition that it has no impact on the
wage distribution above some value x  m. While this assumption seems reasonable on the face
of it, it will not in general be valid within the simple equilibrium framework developed here. In
addition, as I have argued above, the ultimate goal of empirical wage research should probably be
2For another good example, see Heckman and Sedlacek (1981).
3directed to determining welfare rather than employment impacts.
The focus of the Dinardo et al paper is on assessing the impacts of minimum wages and
other institutional features of the labor market on wage distributions. To perform their
semiparametric statistical analysis, they are forced to make a number of rather controversial
assumptions regarding the manner in which minimum wage changes impact both the wage
distribution and employment rates. The wage distributions they ﬁt also have the unfortunate
characteristic of being everywhere continuous, which rules out the spike at the minimum which is
clearly observable in U.S. data, particularly for young and female dependent workers. While the
goal of the analysis is to determine the impact of various institutional features of the labor market
[one of which is the minimum wage] on the increasing levels of wage inequality observed over the
past two decades in the United.States, the paper does not take a clear position on whether such
increasing inequality is good or bad. The model in this paper and some of the examples presented
make it clear that “cross-sectional’ inequality may indeed be a good thing.
There are a number of ways to include minimum wages in equilibrium models of the labor
market. In terms of my work, some of the more relevant theoretical, econometric, and empirical
contributions to this literature include Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Mortensen (1990), Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), van den Berg and Ridder (1998), and Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg
(1999). In these models, which are not based on matching and bargaining but instead utilize
assumptions of wage-posting by homogeneous or heterogeneous ﬁrms, minimum wage restrictions
do not typically result in mass points in the wage distribution at the minimum, and in a number
of cases the wage distributions implied by the theory are grossly at odds with empirical
observation.3 However, this class of models contains examples of situations in which the
3A notable exception to this statement can be found in Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (2000), which provides
4imposition of minimum wages can be Pareto welfare-improving and allow for a number of labor
market phenomena that cannot be captured within our framework. All of the various equilibrium
labor market models based on search-theoretic foundations have their advantages and
disadvantages, but my feeling was that a model based explicitly on bilaterial bargaining between
a given worker and ﬁrm may provide a slightly preferable framework in which to analyze
disaggregated labor market data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I develop a bargaining model in a
continuous-time search environment both in the absence and in the presence of a binding
minimum wage. Section 3 contains a discussion of one measure of population welfare and its
relation to the minimum wage level. I also provide results and examples illustrating the impact of
minimum wages on the wage distribution and the relationship between changes in welfare levels
and wage distributions. In Section 4 I simulate the behavioral model under alternative
speciﬁcations of the labor market environment to demonstrate some of the theoretical results
obtained in Section 3. Section 5 contains a small empirical exercise in which I look at changes in
the wage distribution of 16- to 24-year-old workers between March 1997 and March 1998; between
these two dates the minimum wage changed from $4.75 to $5.15 an hour [in September 1997]. A
brief conclusion is oﬀered in Section 6.
2. L M S
  B
In this section I describe the behavioral model of labor market search with matching and
bargaining. The model is formulated in continuous time and assumes stationarity of the labor
market environment. In the ﬁrst subsection I derive the decision rules for terminating search and
for dividing the match value between worker and ﬁrm in the absence of minimum wages. These
a perfect ﬁt to the data at the expense of uniqueness of equilibrium and analytical complexity.
5results are relatively well-known, and are mainly presented to set ideas and for purposes of
comparison with the case in which a binding minimum wage is present, which is analyzed in the
following subsection.
Throughout I assume that there exists an invariant, technologically determined
distribution of worker-ﬁrm productivity levels which is given by G(θ). When a potential employee
and a ﬁrm meet, which happens at rate λ, the productive value of the match (θ) is immediately
observed by both the applicant and the ﬁrm. At this point a division of the match value is
proposed using a Nash bargaining framework. The searcher’s instantaneous discount rate is given
by ρ>0. The rate of (exogenous) termination of employment contracts is η ≥ 0. While
unemployed individuals search, their instantaneous utility is given by b, which can assume
positive or negative values. For simplicity, I assume that employed individuals do not receive
alternative oﬀers of employment, i.e., there is no on-the-job search. It is straightforward to adapt
the current framework to that case, however.
2.1. Labor Market Decisions without Minimum Wages
I assume that the only factor of production is labor, and that total output of the ﬁrm is
simply the sum of the productivity levels of all of its employees. Then if the ﬁrm “passes” on the
applicant — that is, does not make an employment oﬀer — its “disagreement” outcome is 0 [it
earns no revenue but makes no wage payment]. The applicant’s disagreement value is the value of
continued search, which we denote Vn. For any given value of Vn there exists a corresponding
critical “match” value θ∗ = ρVn (ρ is the instantaneous discount rate), which has the property
that all matches with values at least as great as θ∗ will result in employment while all those
6matches of lower value will not. For any θ ≥ θ∗, the wage oﬀer is given by
w(θ,Vn) = argmax







where without loss of generality it has been assumed that the ﬁrm shares the employee’s eﬀective
rate of discount, ρ + η.
The value of employment at a wage of w is easily determined. Consider an inﬁnitesimally
small period of time ∆t. Over this “period,” either the individual will continue to be employed at











where the term (1+ρ∆t)−1 is an “inﬁnitesimal” discount factor associated with the small interval
∆t, η∆t is the approximate probability of being terminated from one’s current employment by
the end of ∆t, and o(∆t) is a term which has the property that lim∆t→0(o(∆t)/∆t)=0 . The ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side of [2] is the value of the wage payment over the interval, which is the
total payment w∆t multiplied by the “instantaneous” discount factor [think of the payment as
being received at the end of the interval ∆t]. After collecting terms and taking the limit of [2] as





7I now substitute [3] into [1] so as to simplify the problem as follows:








which results in the well-known expression
w(θ,Vn)=a r g m a x
w [w − ρVn]
α [θ − w]
1−α
= αθ +( 1− α)ρVn.
I now move on to compute the value of nonemployment. Using the same setup as above














where λ∆t is the approximate probability of encountering one potential employer over the
interval. Rearranging and taking limits, we have

















Then the ﬁnal (implicit) expression for the value of search is





[θ − ρVn]dG(θ). (4)
Note that this expression is identical to the expression for the reservation value in a model with
no bargaining when θ is the payment to the individual except for the presence of the factor α [see
Flinn and Heckman (1982)]. This is not unexpected since when α =1 , the entire match value is
transferred to the worker, and thus search over θ is the same as search over w.
I can now summarize the important properties of the model. The critical “match” value
θ∗ is equal to ρVn, which is deﬁned by [4]. Since at this match value the wage payment is equal to
w∗ ≡ w(θ∗,V n)=αθ∗ +( 1− α)θ∗ = θ∗, the reservation wage is identical to the reservation match
value. The probability that a random encounter generates an acceptable match is given by ˜ G(θ∗),
where ˜ G denotes the survivor function, 1−G. The rate of leaving unemployment is λ ˜ G(θ∗). As we
can see from [4], since θ∗ is an increasing function of α, rates of unemployment are higher when
searchers have more bargaining power.
9The observed wage density is a simple mapping from the matching density. Since
w(θ,Vn)=αθ +( 1− α)θ∗
⇒ ˜ θ(w,Vn)=
w − (1 − α)θ∗
α
,






˜ G(θ∗) w ≥ θ∗
0 w<θ ∗
.
An example helps to illustrate the structure of the model both with and without binding
minimum wages. The rate of arrival of oﬀers (λ) is set to the value .5 (so that job contacts occur
every 2 “periods” on average), the rate of job dissolutions (η) is set to .02 (so that the average
length of a job is 50 periods), ρ is set to .01, and the instantaneous return from search (b) is set to
-1. The ﬁrm-searcher matching distribution is assumed to be uniform with support [0,10]. I
compute the equilibrium wage distribution for values of α in the set {.25,.50,.75,1.00}.
Figure 1.a plots the uniform p.d.f. that represents g(θ) in this case. Figure 1.b plots the
mapping from draws of θ into wage oﬀers under the four alternative values of α, that is
wα(θ,Vn(α)) = αθ +( 1− α)ρVn(α). Note that α aﬀects the equilibrium mapping both directly
through the slope and indirectly through the disagreement point ρVn(α). Figures 1.c—f plot the
equilibrium wage p.d.f.s for the four α values. Increasing α in the uniform case simply results in
increases in the lower and upper bound of the support of the equilibrium wage distribution, which
is itself uniform. Since increases in α result in increases in the value of search, it is interesting to
note that in this case an increasing mean wage and an increasing dispersion in the wage
10distribution are associated with higher values of search.
2.2. Labor Market Decisions in the Presence of Minimum Wages
Now consider the case in which the interactions between applicants and ﬁrms are
constrained by the presence of a minimum wage. The minimum wage, m, is set by the
government and is assumed to apply to all potential matches. I assume that the only
compensation provided by the ﬁrm is the wage. Thus there are no other forms of compensation
the ﬁrm can adjust so as to “undo” the minimum wage payment requirement.
I impose the minimum wage in the framework established in the previous section. As
should be clear, any m ≤ θ∗ has no eﬀect on the behavior of applicants or ﬁrms and thus would
be a meaningless constraint. Thus I consider only the eﬀects of an imposition of m>θ ∗.
Recall that the expected value of the match from the point of view of the ﬁrm is
proportional to (θ − w). Firms cannot earn positive proﬁts on matches which have a value less
than m. Since m>θ ∗, an immediate implication of the imposition of the minimum wage is that
fewer contacts will result in jobs — the standard employment eﬀect.
In terms of wage payments, the minimum wage acts solely as a side constraint on the










where the only diﬀerence from [1] is the restriction w ≥ m. The eﬀect on the solution is relatively
intuitive. Under the “constrained” Nash bargaining problem, there will exist a value of search
which we denote ˜ Vn(m) [note that this value is not equal to the Vn which we deﬁned in the
unconstrained problem — it will be deﬁned below]. If we ignore the minimum wage constraint in
11determining the wage payment given a match value of θ and the search value ˜ Vn(m), we get
˜ w(θ, ˜ Vn(m)) = αθ +( 1− α)ρ˜ Vn(m). (5)
Under this division of the match value, the worker would receive a wage of m when θ = ˆ θ, where
ˆ θ(m, ˜ Vn(m)) =
m − (1 − α)ρ˜ Vn(m)
α
.
Then if ˆ θ ≤ m, all “feasible” matches would generate wage oﬀers at least as large as m. When
ˆ θ>m , this is not the case. When θ belongs to the set [m,ˆ θ), the oﬀer according to [5] is less than
m. However, when confronted with the choice of giving some of its surplus to the worker versus a
return of 0, the ﬁrm pays the wage of m for all θ ∈ [m,ˆ θ). Wages for acceptable θ outside of this
set are determined according to [5].
I can now consider the individual’s search problem given this wage oﬀer function. Using
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{[ ˜ G(m) − ˜ G(
m − (1 − α)ρVn(m)
α




[θ − ρ˜ Vn(m)]dG(θ)}. (8)
It makes some sense to refer to the vale ρ˜ Vn(m) as the “implicit” reservation wage. Unlike
the situation in which a binding minimum wage does not exist, this value is not the minimal
acceptable wage and match value. The acceptable wage/match value is rather the imposed
minimum value m. Nonetheless, the value ρ˜ Vn is of critical importance in determining equilibrium
wages and the welfare eﬀects of minimum wage changes.
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˜ G(m) w = m
0 w<m .
(9)
The minimum wage side constraint produces an equilibrium wage distribution which has a mass
point at m and has wages being continuously distributed on the interval (m,∞).4
Let us reconsider the uniform example after a minimum wage of 7.5 has been imposed;
since the distribution now has a mass point, it is more convenient to plot the c.d.f. than the p.d.f.
4This statement is predicated on θ being a continuously distributed random variable with unbounded support.
13Figure 2.a plots the c.d.f. of the matching distribution. Figure 2.b contains the equilibrium wage
oﬀer mapping from θ to w when m =7 .5. For the case of α = .25, the equilibrium wage function
maps all values of θ ≥ 7.5 into a wage oﬀer of w =7 .5. At least when the distribution G has
bounded support, this demonstrates that the imposition of a minimum wage can result in a
degenerate wage oﬀer distribution at the minimum, as we see in Figure 2.c. In the case of α = .5
(Figure 2.d), the equilibrium wage distribution has a substantial mass point at 7.5, with a
relatively “narrow” range of wages above it. When α = .75 or 1 (Figures 2.e and 2.f), the
minimum wage does not substantially aﬀect the equilibrium wage distribution, which is not to say
that the welfare eﬀects of the imposition of such a minimum wage in these cases are
inconsequential.
3. M	 W E
  W  W D	
In Flinn (1999) I provide an extensive discussion of some possible measures of welfare that
can be developed using this labor market model. I focus on one simple measure here, which is the
value of unemployed search given the minimum wage m, or ˜ Vn(m). It is convenient to work with
this measure because it is both a scalar and readily interpretable. Since all individuals begin their
labor market careers in the unemployment state, ˜ Vn(m) represents the ex ante value of the labor
market career for individuals inhabiting a labor market characterized by Ψ ≡(ρλµαη ) when
the minimum wage is set at the level m forever. While it is clear that minimum wages do change
over time, as do other labor market parameters, such a measure is consistent with my modeling
assumption of stationarity. Readers interested in the development of other welfare measures can
consult Flinn (1999).
Note that I do not consider the welfare of ﬁrms either explicitly or implicitly. Clearly,
when a minimum wage results in an increase in the value of search for individuals on the supply
14side of the market, the proportion of the match-speciﬁc surplus available to ﬁrms is diminished.
Thus, there are no Pareto-maximizing minimum wages for the economy as a whole in this
framework. Nonetheless, under any minimum wage ﬁrms continue to earn nonnegative proﬁts on
all employment contracts. Since the empirical component of my research uses data exclusively
from the supply side of the market, for pragmatic reasons I can only attempt to characterize and
compare labor market and welfare outcomes for individuals in any event.
3.1. Results Using Unconditional Wage Distributions
Within this model the eﬀects of imposing a minimum wage on the accepted wage
distribution are complex. The minimum observed wage will always increase in response to the
imposition of a binding minimum wage or when a binding minimum wage is increased. While
intuition might lead one to expect that comparing wage distributions associated with the same
labor market environment Ψ and diﬀerent minimum wage levels in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance criteria might be a reliable guide to underlying welfare levels, this is not typically the
case. Using the welfare criterion I have deﬁned above, the fact that the wage distribution under
the new [higher] minimum wage does not ﬁrst order stochastically dominate the old one is
informative about welfare, but the converse is not the case. I now provide the demonstration of
this claim.
Deﬁnition 1 Distribution F2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates distribution F1 if F1(x) ≥ F2(x)
for all x and F1(x) >F 2(x) for some x.
In terms of the model, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Let the wage distribution under the minimum wage m be given by F2(w) and










for all z ≥ m. (10)














































Corollary 3 F2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F1 if ˜ Vn(m) ≥ ˜ Vn(m).
Proof. The left-hand side of [10] is by construction greater than or equal to 1. Then the
16inequality is satisﬁed since
˜ Vn(m) ≥ ˜ Vn(m)
⇒
z − (1 − α)ρ˜ Vn(m)
α
≤










Unfortunately, this result is not of much practical signiﬁcance since ˜ Vn(m) ≥ ˜ Vn(m) is
only a suﬃcient condition for stochastic dominance of F2 with respect to F1, not a necessary
condition. A more practically useful result is the following.
Corollary 4 F2 does not ﬁrst order stochastically dominate F1 if ˜ Vn(m) < ˜ Vn(m).













x − (1 − α)ρ˜ Vn(m)
α
<
x − (1 − α)ρ˜ Vn(m)
α
⇒ ˜ Vn(m) > ˜ Vn(m).
These results suggest that observed wage distributions before and after minimum wage
changes can reveal whether the minimum wage increase worsened welfare, but cannot be used to
infer whether welfare increased. In particular, the ﬁnding that the new wage distribution, F2, ﬁrst
17order stochastically dominates the old one is consistent with either ˜ Vn(m) > ˜ Vn(m) or
˜ Vn(m) < ˜ Vn(m). The ﬁnding that F2 does not ﬁrst order stochastically dominate F1 implies that
˜ Vn(m) > ˜ Vn(m).5
Obviously F2 may not ﬁrst order stochastically dominate F1 due to a variety of features of
the two distribution functions. My model speciﬁcation places restrictions on the way in which
FOSD can fail. In particular, if F2 does not FOSD F1, there must exist some x∗ such that
F2(x) ≤ F1(x) for all x ≤ x∗ and F2(x) >F 1(x) for all x>x ∗. That is, the c.d.f.s should intersect
either never (in which case F2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F1) or once and only once (in
the case of failure of FOSD).6 Multiple crossings of the c.d.f.s could be produced by sampling
variability or model misspeciﬁcation.
To illustrate some of my analytical results I extend the example using the uniform G on
the interval [0,10]. In Figure 3 I plot the equilibrium wage distributions for minimum wage values
of m ∈{ 6,7,8,9} for values of the bargaining power parameter α ∈{ .5,.7,.8,.9}. In the case of
α = .5 (Figure 3.a), the value of search increases when moving from m =6to m =7 , and the
equilibrium wage distribution at m =7ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the one associated
with m =6as must be the case from Corollary 3. However, though the value of search decreases
when m moves from 7 to 8 and 9, these (degenerate) wage distributions ﬁrst order stochastically
dominate the one associated with m =7 . Thus, from the observation that one wage distribution
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates another, we cannot generally conclude that welfare has
increased using my welfare criterion, which is consistent with the analytic results presented above.
The remaining panels of Figure 3 demonstrate that minimum wage increases do not
necessarily lead to new wage distributions which stochastically dominate the original ones. I have
5Note that F1 can never FOSD F2 for the simple reason that F1(w) > 0 and F2(w)=0for all w ∈ [m,m
).
6The single-crossing property is not suﬃcient to produce second order stochastic dominance.
18chosen high values of α to illustrate this point, since when α is high, minimum wage increases will
in general lead to reductions in the value of search. This point is best illustrated in Figure 3.c,
corresponding to the case of α = .8. The wage distribution associated with m =9does not
stochastically dominate any of the other minimum wage distributions, the reason being the
relatively low search value associated with m =9 . Observations of this failure of FOSD would
have led us to correctly infer that there had been a reduction in welfare.
As these results and illustrations make clear, it is diﬃcult to assess welfare impacts from
changes in wage distributions. I now turn to another characteristic of the relationship between
the pre- and post-change wage distributions that may have some informational value and to which
it is possible to give a reasonably intuitive and yet precise deﬁnition connected with the notion of
spillover.
3.2. Results Using Conditional Wage Distributions
Consider a wage rate w such that w>m  >m .Then under either value of the minimum
wage the density of accepted wages at w exists.7 Consider the ratio of the density at w under m







˜ G(m) × g(˜ θ(w, ˜ Vn(m)))
˜ G(m) × g(˜ θ(w, ˜ Vn(m)))
.
The ratio ˜ G(m)/ ˜ G(m) in L(w;m,m) c a nb er e f e r r e dt oa st h etruncation eﬀect of the
minimum wage change. Since ˜ G(m) > ˜ G(m), this eﬀect is always greater than 1 and is
7For purposes of this discussion we assume that the matching distribution has unbounded support, which implies
that the wage distribution will share this characteristic as well whenever α>0.
19independent of the value of w, w > m; I will write it as T(m,m). This eﬀect on the ratio of wage
densities at w is viewed as rather mechanical and uninteresting. Instead, what I will refer to as
the spillover eﬀect is the term
S(w;m,m)=
g(˜ θ(w, ˜ Vn(m)))
g(˜ θ(w, ˜ Vn(m)))
.
In this way we have constructed a decomposition of the likelihood ratio of the wage density at w
before and after the wage change, which is
L(w;m,m)=T(m,m)S(w;m,m).
It will be convenient to work with an additive decomposition of the log likelihood ratio, or
lnL(w;m,m)=l nT(m,m)+l nS(w;m,m).
Using the logarithmic decomposition, it is clear that the truncation eﬀect shifts lnL by the
uniform amount lnT(m,m). Furthermore we know that lnT(m.m) > 0 for any two binding
minimum wages m >m .Our main interest is in the manner in which the shape of the wage
density above m changes with a change in the minimum wage. I will assess this by looking at the







I work with the logarithm of the likelihood ratio so that the truncation eﬀect can be ignored.
20Deﬁnition 5 The quantity ∂ lnS(w;m,m)/∂w is called the shape perturbation at w associated
with the minimum wage increase from m to m. We denote this quantity by SP(w;m,m).
In general, minimum wage changes result in changes in the shape of the density above the
new minimum wage. It is interesting to consider when this would not be the case. I begin with
one readily checkable suﬃcient condition for the absence of shape perturbations.
Proposition 6 Assume that G(θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable on its support Q ⊆ R+, where Q
is a connected set. Then there is no spillover when moving from minimum wage m to m if and
only if at least one of the following:
1. ˜ Vn(m)=˜ Vn(m)
2. g(θ)=τ−1 exp(βθ)for all θ ∈ Q, where τ = τ(β,Q)=


Q exp(βx)dx < ∞.









= k ∀w>m .
If ˜ Vn(m)=˜ Vn(m), then S(w;m,m)=1for all w>m , so condition 1 is obvious.
Rewrite S(w;m,m) as g(y +b)/g(y +a). This expression is independent of y for all values
of y if and only if g(x+ y)=τg(x)g(y) for all values of x and y such that g(x + y),g (x), and g(y)
are well-deﬁned and non-zero. After rewriting
g(x) = exp(r(x)),
21the condition g(x + y)=τg(x)g(y) implies
r(x + y)=l nτ + r(x)+r(y),
which for continuous r is equivalent to
r(x)=−lnτ + βx
for some β. Then
g(x)=τ−1 exp(βx),




In what follows, when looking for “spillover eﬀects” I will be focusing primarily on
whether condition 2 in the above proposition is satisﬁed, since it is the only “global” one of the
two. By this I mean that satisfaction of condition 2 does not depend on the particular values of m
and m chosen, so long as they are both binding minimum wages.
The types of distributions which satisfy condition 2 are relatively familiar ones. When
β =0 , then we have g(x)=τ−1 on Q, which implies that Q is a ﬁnite interval [θ,θ], with
0 ≤ θ<θ<∞, so that τ =[ θ−θ]. In this case G corresponds to a uniform distribution. When
β<0, we have the case of a negative exponential distribution. When Q = R+, then τ = |β|−1.
When Q is a proper subset of R+, then g is a truncated negative exponential density. Finally,
when β>0, for integrability of the density, Q must be a proper subset of R+. In other analytic
8I am very much indebted to Bernard Selanié for suggesting this method of proof.
22respects this case closely resembles that of β<0.
The power of Proposition 6 lies in its demonstration that these distributions are the only
ones in the class of distributions considered that cannot exhibit “spillover” for any values of m
and m. Furthermore, the negative exponential distribution is the only one that cannot exhibit
spillover if our attention is restricted to distributions whose support is R+.
A result which follows immediately from condition 2 of the above proposition that we
shall make use of in the sequel is the following corollary.
Corollary 7 If condition 2 of Proposition 6 is satisﬁed, then










I now develop a test for what I have deﬁned above as spillover eﬀects that does not require
an assumption of any particular functional form for G, and in fact does not make much use of the
model structure. In this sense, this can be considered a general test for whether a minimum wage
change results in shape perturbation eﬀects. It is important to keep in mind that the absence of
shape perturbation eﬀects does not imply that there are no general welfare eﬀects of minimum
wage changes in the population. I will illustrate this point below with the use of some simulations.
The test I develop is a straightforward extension of the general family of nonparametric
tests which test whether two population distributions are equal over the entire (common) support
23of the distributions. Let F1(X) denote the cumulative distribution function of the random
variable X and let F2(Y ) denote the c.d.f. of the random variable Y. Let the common support of
the two distributions be denoted by Ω. There exist several nonparametric tests of the null
hypothesis: H0 : F1(x)=F2(x), ∀x ∈ Ω; well-known examples are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two
Sample Test and the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test.
I propose to test proportionality of the population wage densities after a minimum wage
change over a subset of the support of the wage distribution. I employ the following result.
Proposition 8 Let f1(w)=δf2(w) for all w ∈ S ⊂ Ω, where S is a connected set strictly
contained in Ω, with S =( a,b). Then F1(w|w ∈ S)=F2(w|w ∈ S).

















= F2(w|w ∈ S), ∀w ∈ S.
To implement the test for shape perturbation requires that I restrict attention to the
subset of wages from the two minimum wage regimes that are greater than the largest minimum
wage. Let m denote the higher of the two (binding) minimum wages and m the lesser of the two.
I have access to n1 wage observations which are greater than m from the regime when m is in
24force, where the draws are denoted w1
1,w1
2,...,w1
n1, and we have access to n2 wage observations all




n2. The null hypothesis that to be tested is that
H0 : F1(w|w>m )=F2(w|w>m ), ∀w>m . (11)






i ≤ w], ∀w>m ,
where χ[A] is the indicator function which takes the value 1 when A is true and is 0 otherwise. I
will employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test to test [11], which is based on the
maximum distance between the two empirical (conditional) cumulative distribution functions. In
our case the test statistic is deﬁned as
Dn1,n2 =m a x
w>m

  ˆ F1(w|w>m ) − ˆ F2(w|w>m )

 .
The “degrees of freedom” for the two-sample test are given by

n1×n2
n1+n2. Using this value, critical
values for Dn1,n2 are the same as for the one-sample version of the test and are readily available.9
3.3. Results Using Matched Data
By matched data we mean observations on the same individuals under (at least) two
diﬀerent minimum wage regimes. A number of researchers have examined the impact of minimum
wage changes on labor market outcomes using panel data,10 though none have attempted to
9See Rao (1973), pp. 420-422, for a brief discussion of these results.
10See, for example, Egge et al. (1970), Linneman (1982), Smith and Vavrichek (1992), and Currie and Fallick
25assess welfare eﬀects per se from such data. Given the assumptions of the model, it is trivial to
learn the welfare eﬀect of a minimum wage given access to wage information for at least one
individual who was paid more than the minimum wage in each year. Let there exist a set of
individuals in the population I who remained at the same employer both before and after the
minimum wage changed and who have a wage rate greater than the (respective) minimum in both
years. Let i be a member of this set, and let their pre- and post-minimum wage change wage
observations be denoted by wi and w
i. Then
wi = αθi +( 1− α)ρVn(m),θ i > ˆ θ(m, ˜ Vn(m))
w
i = αθi +( 1− α)ρVn(m),θ i > ˆ θ(m, ˜ Vn(m))
so that
w
i − wi = ρ(1 − α){˜ Vn(m) − ˜ Vn(m)}. (12)
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 9 The minimum wage change was welfare improving if and only if
E(w − w|w>m ,w  >m ) > 0.
Proof. According to [12] the wage diﬀerence for any i ∈ I is equal to ρ(1−α){˜ Vn(m)− ˜ Vn(m)},
which is independent of i, so that the expectation over the set I, or any subset of I, is equal to
this constant. The constant is only positive if and only if ˜ Vn(m) − ˜ Vn(m) > 0.
Because the constant is the same for all members of I, the following strong implication
(1996).
26emerges.
Corollary 10 The wage diﬀerences (w
i − wi)=( w
j − wj), for all i,j ∈ I.
This result implies that the variance in wage changes over the set I, or any subset of I, is
0, which is clearly something we don’t expect to see in any actual data set. We shall discuss this
issue further below when we carry out the empirical exercise.
It is obvious that there are many reasons to expect increases in the average wage paid to
job stayers [those paid more than the minimum wage in this case] that are unrelated to changes in
the nominal minimum wage. However, it is the case that the model places an additional
restriction on the magnitude of the increase in the average wage for our reference group that can
result solely from a change in the statuatory minimum wage. This restriction is developed in the
following two results.




Proof. Let x ≡ ρ˜ Vn(m). Then the implicit reservation wage under a binding minimum wage m
is the solution to
0=x − b − k{(G(ˆ θ) − G(m))(m − x)+α

ˆ θ
(θ − x)dG(θ)}, (13)




k(G(ˆ θ) − G(m)) − kg(m)(m − x)
1+k(G(ˆ θ) − G(m)) + kα(1 − G(ˆ θ))
.
27Since ˆ θ>m ,all terms in the denominator are positive or nonnegative. Since m − x ≤ 0, the
numerator is less than or equal to k(G(ˆ θ) − G(m)).
Corollary 12 Let m and m be two binding minimum wages in the labor market environment Ψ,
with m<m  < ∞. For an individual at the same job under m and m, and for whom w>mand
w >m ,
w − w ≤ m − m.
Proof. An individual at the same job [i.e., the same θ] is paid w = αθ +( 1− α)ρVn(m;Ψ)
under m and w = αθ +( 1− α)ρVn(m;Ψ)under m, so that
w − w =( 1− α)ρ(Vn(m;Ψ)− Vn(m;Ψ)),w>m , w  >m .
By Proposition 11 ρ(Vn(m;Ψ)− Vn(m;Ψ))≤ m − m, and the result follows since (1 − α) ≤ 1.
Since the data I use below spans a minimum wage increase of 40 cents, by Corollary 12 we
should not observe a change in the wages of job stayers (paid more than the minimum wage in
both periods) of more than $.40 [and this is the upper bound corresponding to the case of α =0 ] .
Thus the model places strong restrictions on both the magnitude of the change in the average
wage of job stayers and the variance of wage changes within this group of individuals.
Unfortunately, the data used in the empirical exercise do not allow me to match
individuals in the periods before and after the minimum wage change with absolute certainty.
Notwithstanding these matching problems, there is the additional task of determining whether
the individual has the same job in March 1998 she had in March 1997. Since there will be
28substantial scope for misclassifying employed individuals in terms of their membership in
population I, it is worthwhile to determine the eﬀect of the minimum wage on the mean and
standard deviation of wage changes in the population of individuals who changed jobs and who
were paid more than the minimum wage in each period. I deﬁne as population I all individuals
with w>m ,w  >m , and θ = θ. The mean wage change under these selection rules is given by
E(w − w|w >m ,w>m,θ = θ)=ρ(1 − α){˜ Vn(m) − ˜ Vn(m)} (14)
+α{E(θ|θ > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))) − E(θ|θ>ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)))},
where I have used the fact that E(θ|θ >a ,θ>b )=E(θ|θ >a ) and
E(θ|θ >a ,θ>b )=E(θ|θ>b ) under the model.11 Since E(ω|ω>a ) is a nondecreasing function
of a, there are not any strong implications we can derive for the mean wage change in the
population I because the lower truncation point ˆ θ depends both on m and ˜ Vn(m). To show this,
observe that
E(θ|θ > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))) − E(θ|θ>ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)))








⇔ ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))  ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)).
11This independence property of the conditional expectation functions would not hold if on-the-job search were
allowed, for example.
29Now
ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)) > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)) (15)
⇔ m − m>ρ (1 − α){˜ Vn(m) − ˜ Vn(m)}.
Equation [15] shows the source of the ambiguity. Say that welfare decreases after the minimum
wage change. In this case, ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)) > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)) so that E(θ|θ > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m)))
− E(θ|θ>ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))) > 0 and [14] has an indeterminate sign. On the other hand, when the
minimum wage has a positive eﬀect on welfare, then the inequality in [15] may not be satisﬁed; as
a result E(θ|θ > ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))) − E(θ|θ>ˆ θ(m,ρ˜ Vn(m))) has an indeterminate sign and
therefore so has the entire expression [14]. Thus the mean wage change in the population I
cannot be used to infer welfare eﬀects without additional information.
Another important diﬀerence between the distributions of wage changes in the populations
I and I is in their respective variances. As I have noted above, the variance of w − w is 0 in I,
while in I it is strictly positive as long as G is nondegenerate. I will refer to this result when
attempting to interpret the empirical results below that were obtained using a matched sample.
4. I	
Before proceeding to the empirical example I will illustrate a number of the results derived
in the previous section by conducting some small simulation exercises. In conducting these
exercises I will continue to use the value of search given a minimum wage of m as the welfare
measure. The simulation looks at the cross-sectional wage distribution when all agents in the
population are identical, in the sense of inhabiting the same labor market environment (Ψ).I
performed the exercise once under the assumption that the matching distribution was negative
30exponential and the other time under the assumption that the G was log normal. Since the
density of the negative exponential has the separability property given in Proposition 6 (condition
2), there will be no spillovers produced by minimum wage changes. Since the log normal density
does not have this property, spillover eﬀects of minimum wage changes generally will be observed
in this case. The parameter values assumed for the labor market environment in the two cases are:
Distribution








where under the exponential assumption, g(θ;µ)=µexp(−µθ) and under the log normal






). Most of the parameter values are
similar to those obtained in initial attempts to estimate the equilibrium model using CPS data as
reported in Flinn (1999). The ﬂow parameters should be thought of as measured in monthly
units; thus the assumption that λ = .2 implies that the average duration between job oﬀers to an
unemployed searcher is 5 months and the dissolution rate of .05 implies that jobs last 20 months
on average.
I assume that the current minimum wage is 5, which is a binding minimum wage under
31both distributional assumptions. Under the log normal distributional assumption, the welfare
value associated with m =5is equal to 3.704, while under the exponential it is 3.474 [note that it
is not meaningful to compare these two values]. Since the minimum wage is binding in both cases,
the observed wage distribution will have a spike at 5. This is illustrated in the plots of the
respective c.d.f.s in Figures 4.a and 4.b.
I now consider the impact of imposing one of two alternative minimum wages on the labor
market [where the labor market is summarized by the table of values above]. The ﬁrst alternative
consists of raising the minimum wage by 50 percent, to 7.50, while the second is an even more
radical change of 100 percent, to 10.00. The welfare values associated with each of the six cases
considered is
Distribution




I have deliberately chosen parameter values and minimum wage rates so as to attain the result
that while a minimum wage change to 7.50 is beneﬁcial under either distributional assumption, an
increase to 10.00 results in a lower level of welfare than under the status quo of 5.00.
The plots of the wage c.d.f.s under the alternative minimum wage levels are presented in
Figures 4.c—4.f. As we know from the model structure, the spikes at the minimum wage become
progressively greater as the minimum wage is increased. However, it is clear that the underlying
welfare level is not monotonically increasing in the size of the spike, so this is not a useful criteria
32for judging the benevolence of a minimum wage change.
I have graphed the diﬀerences in the cumulative wage distributions associated with the
proposed new minimum wages of 7.50 and 10.00 and that associated with the current minimum
wage of 5.00 in Figure 5. In all four panels the new wage oﬀer distribution stochastically
dominates the old one. Welfare is in fact only increased in two of the four cases, however.
Figure 6 contains ratios of the conditional c.d.f.s associated with the two proposed new
minimum wages to the conditional c.d.f. associated with the baseline minimum wage under both
distributional assumptions. Figures 6.b and 6.d correspond to the negative exponential case. The
equality of the conditional distributions under this distributional follows from the analytic results
above. The important point to note in this case is that the absence of spillover, as I have formally
deﬁned it, does not indicate the absence of welfare eﬀects in the population at large.I nt h ec a s e
represented in Figure 6.b, although there was no spillover when moving from m =5to m =7 .50
there was a positive welfare gain. Conversely, the case of no spillover represented in Figure 6.d
corresponded to a worsening of the welfare of population members. The lesson from this is that
when the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisﬁed, changes in the conditional wage distributions
cannot reveal anything about changes in the value of unemployed search..
Under the log normality assumption, we know from Proposition 6 that the conditional
c.d.f.s will only be proportional if the values of search under the diﬀerent minimum wages are the
same, which they are not. Figures 6.a and 6.c conﬁrm the fact that spillover exists in this case.




33where the conditional cumulative distribution function in the numerator corresponds to the
regime in which the minimum wage is set at 7.50 and the conditional c.d.f. in the denominator
corresponds to the regime in which the minimum wage is set at 5.00. The fact that this ratio is
monotonically decreasing from a value greater than 1 and asymptotically approaching 1 from
above indicates that the conditional c.d.f. associated with m =5ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates the conditional c.d.f. associated with m =7 .50. Though one might interpret this result
to imply that the conditional wage oﬀer distribution associated with m =5is “better” than the
one associated with m =7 .50, this is not the case. Figure 6.c demonstrates the converse result. In
that case, the conditional wage distribution associated with m =1 0ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates the one associated with m =5 ;however, the welfare level associated with the
“dominated” conditional wage distribution is higher.
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The data for my empirical example are drawn from the March 1997 and 1998 Current
Population Survey (CPS) samples. I have selected these two periods because they span a change
in minimum wage law. In March 1997, the national minimum wage was $4.75 an hour, having
been changed from $4.25 on October 1, 1996. At the time of the March 1997 interviews, the
minimum wage of $4.75 had been in eﬀect for approximately 6 months. On September 1, 1997,
the minimum wage of $4.75 was increased to $5.15. Thus at the time of the March 1998 CPS
interviews, the new minimum wage had been in eﬀect for approximately 7 months.
As is true of the empirical analysis performed in Flinn (1999), I focus attention on labor
market participants between the ages of 16 and 24, inclusive. This age group has by far the
largest proportion of employed members paid exactly at or within a few cents of the minimum
wage. If the minimum wage is to have a substantial impact on the labor market outcomes and
34welfare of any particular group in the population, it is most likely to be this one.
The CPS is a household survey of addresses which has the structure of a rotating panel.
Dwelling units are selected to be in the survey for 4 consecutive months, then are out of the
sample for 8 months, and then ﬁnally return for 4 consecutive months. Detailed information
concerning each household member’s current job, if they are employed at the time of the monthly
survey, is only obtained from individuals in their 4th and 8th month of participation in the
sample. Thus I have selected individuals for inclusion in the sample who at the time of the March
interview were (1) between 16 and 24 years old, (2) were in the 4th or 8th month of survey
participation, and (3) reported themselves to be currently working or searching for a job. We
have not excluded individuals who reported being enrolled in school full-time since this group
accounts for a substantial proportion of employees paid the minimum wage.
A few characteristics of the CPS data and U.S. minimum wage laws complicate any
empirical analysis on this issue, even one as simple and descriptive as that carried out here. First,
the minimum wage is set in terms of hourly compensation rates, though many employees are not
paid on an hourly basis. Employed individuals in the Outgoing Rotation Groups (i.e., those in
their 4th or 8th month of survey participation) are asked whether they are paid on an hourly
basis. If they respond that they are paid on that basis, they are asked to report their hourly rate.
All employed individuals in the ORG are also asked their gross weekly earnings and their usual
weekly hours of work. For individuals paid on an hourly basis, their hourly wage report is used as
a measure of their wage rate. For employed individuals who do not report an hourly wage, I
attempt to infer one by using the standard procedure of dividing the gross weekly wage by their
reported usual hours of work.12 Since individuals whose wages are inferred from their report of
12This procedure fails when usual weekly hours are not reported, which they are not when individuals report that
35gross weekly wages and usual hours are likely to have a noisier measure of their “true” rate of
hourly compensation, they are less likely to be clustered tightly around or exactly at the
prevailing minimum wage, even when that is their true “target” hourly compensation rate. This
problem provides another rationale for focusing attention on young labor market participants,
since they are much more likely to be paid on an hourly basis than are older workers.13
The second important issue with the CPS data is that of proxy respondents. When CPS
interviewers contact a household, one individual in the household provides all the information for
each person living in it. This person is often the head of the household or the spouse of the head.
Since many minimum wage workers live as dependents in someone else’s household, often their
parents’, the measurement problems we referred to in the previous paragraph are likely to be
exacerbated. While these measurement problems signiﬁcantly reduce the appeal of the CPS, it
remains the best large-scale and representative survey of the U.S. population for studying
minimum wage eﬀects on labor market outcomes.
In the second stage of the empirical analysis, I construct an “event study” that attempts
to determine whether there were any discernible eﬀects of the minimum wage change between
March 1997 and March 1998 on the labor market status of individuals who appear in both
samples. Since the CPS does not provide unique individual-level identiﬁers that would allow
researchers to match individuals across years in a straightforward manner, a more circuitous
procedure must be used. I begin by matching household identiﬁcation numbers across March 1997
and March 1998; the household identiﬁer is unique so that errors in matching introduced at this
stage should be almost nonexistent. The person matching is performed as follows. When a
they have no set weekly work schedule.
13In the 1997 March CPS sample I have drawn, 83.7 percent of employed individuals report being paid on an hourly
basis, while in the 1998 March CPS sample the corresponding percentage is 84.1
36household-level match is found between the two years, for each individual in the household in 1997
I determine whether there is anyone in the same household in 1998 who is (1) of the same sex and
(2) 0 to 2 years older. If any individual in the 1998 household satisﬁes these two conditions, they
are considered to be the same person. Of course, the presence of same-sex twins, for example, will
cause problems, but it is likely that the success rate of this matching procedure is quite high.
5.1. Cross-Sectional Wage Distributions
I begin by presenting histograms of cross-sectional wages for the unmatched sample in
March 1997 and March 1998, which are contained in Figure 7.14 In each ﬁgure, vertical lines are
drawn at the wage rates 4.75 and 5.15 for reference purposes. One feature of both of the ﬁgures
that is immediately apparent is the large number of spikes. These spikes tend to occur both at
the minimum wage (i.e., 4.75 in 1997 and 5.15 in 1998) and at other points that are likely to be
the result of reporting error. By way of illustration, the following small table shows the
proportion of each sample that gives a wage report exactly equal to one of ﬁve possible values.
Proportion






14I do not use any “smoothers” on these histograms by choice. Since the model underlying my analysis is predicated
on the wage distribution not being everywhere continuous, the use of such devices would not be consistent with the
theory, hence my criticism of the continuity assumptions utilized in Dinardo et al. (1996).
37The wage rate 5.00 is the modal value of the 1997 hourly wage distribution and the wage rate
6.00 is the modal value for 1998. In both cases, these happen to the integers immediately above
the current minimum wage, but whether this is simply a coincidence is diﬃcult to know. Even
though I would claim that these results suggest the importance of rounding error in the data, it is
important to note that the hourly rate of 4.75 is the third most commonly reported value in 1997
and 5.15 is the third most commonly reported value in 1998. I would argue that neither of these
numbers, particularly 5.15, is a natural focal point for someone reporting a wage rate she is
unsure of or wishes not to reveal. I take this as indirect evidence that the mass point at the
minimum wage is a “real” one in both years.15
From the above table and the histogram, some shifts in the wage distribution between the
two years are apparent. The mass point at the minimum wage in the two periods is essentially
constant at 6 percent. In addition, there is some possible visual evidence that above the value
5.15 the distribution has shifted toward the right tail between the two years. I shall now
rigorously examine this impression.
I begin by looking at the relationship between the empirical c.d.f.s in March 1997 and
March 1998. From Corollary 4, we know that if ˆ F98 does not FOSD ˆ F97, then the increase in the
minimum wage from $4.75 to $5.15 actually decreased welfare. To compute the relevant empirical
c.d.f.s, I used all hourly wage observations from March 1997 that were greater than or equal to
$4.75 and all hourly wage observations from March 1998 that were greater than or equal to $5.15.
Figure 8.a contains the plots of the empirical c.d.f.s for the two years which were constructed from
these wage observations, and Figure 8.b contains the diﬀerences in the c.d.f.s [i.e., ˆ F98 − ˆ F97]. For
15For making such an argument possible, I am grateful to the U.S. Congress, which has chosen not to set the
nonfarm or uniﬁed minimum wage at an integer value since 1975 (when the nonfarm minimum wage was $2.00 for a
1-year period).
38all values of w ≥ 4.75, ˆ F98 ≤ ˆ F97. Without conducting formal tests for FOSD, the evidence is
relatively compelling for the presumption that the new wage distribution ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates the old. However, from this observation we cannot conclude that individuals on the
supply side of the market were in fact better oﬀ in 1998 than they were in 1997.
Turning attention to the detection of spillover as a result of the new minimum wage, I use
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test after restricting both samples [1997 and 1998] to
include only wage observations above the new minimum [which was 5.15 in this case]. The results
are presented in Figure 9. The top panel presents graphs of the conditional c.d.f.s for the two
years. There are notable diﬀerences between the two, which may be easier to view in the bottom
panel where I plot ˆ F98(w|w>5.15) − ˆ F97(w|w>5.15). If the diﬀerences were less than 0 for all
values of w>5.15, then the conditional distribution of wages greater than 5.15 (or at least the
estimate of it) would ﬁrst order stochastically dominate the same distribution for 1997. While
this is true for most values of w>5.15, it is not true for all. Therefore, a ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance relationship does not seem to hold, but it does seem that the conditional distribution
in 1998 is more skewed toward higher values than is the 1997 conditional distribution.
I conducted a formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distributions as described above.
The maximum distance between the two estimated conditional c.d.f.s is .0418 in absolute value.
Given the large sample sizes of 1,061 and 1,393, the probability of obtaining a value of the test
statistic of .055 is 5 percent under the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in the conditional c.d.f.s.
Therefore we conclude that there is no strong indication that the conditional distributions above
the 1998 minimum wage changed in any systematic manner.16
16The test is not strictly appropriate since I have not constructed the two samples so as to ensure that the same
individual does not appear in both samples. Since some individuals undoubtedly do belong to both the 1997 and
1998 samples, the assumption of independence is violated to some degree and the test results are biased, most likely
in favor of the null hypothesis.
395.2. Empirical Analysis using the Matched CPS Sample
In this section I use the matched CPS sample in an attempt to determine something
about the welfare eﬀect of the minimum wage change in September 1997. In describing the CPS
data, I noted that it is not possible to be absolutely sure that individuals were accurately
matched from the March 1997 and March 1998 samples, though the error rate should be small.
More problematic for the utilization of the results which were derived in Section 3.3 is the
inability to determine whether or not the individual is working at the same job in the two
periods. This is primarily due to the fact that the CPS does not collect any information on the
length of time individuals have been employed by their current employers. It is not possible to
convincingly circumvent this problem, and our “solution” is admittedly problematic. Individuals
will be considered to be at the same job in the two periods if the industrial and occupational
classiﬁcation of their job is the same in March 1997 and in March 1998. In determining whether
they are the same, I use a relatively crude classiﬁcation system that distinguishes between about
15 occupational and 20 industrial categories. I could have used three-digit occupation and
industry codes, but I felt that reporting error, especially given the problem of proxy respondents,
would have resulted in too few individuals classiﬁed as “stayers.”
To make use of the analytic results from Section 3.3, attention is restricted to matched
cases in which the individual is employed both in March 1997 and in March 1998 and is paid more
than $4.75 an hour in 1997 and more than $5.15 an hour in 1998. After imposing the matching
and selection criteria, I was left with a total of 245 cases. Of these, 37.5 percent were classiﬁed as
being in the same major industry and occupation groups in the two years. I will somewhat loosely
refer to this group as “stayers,” bearing in mind all the caveats which have been mentioned. A
variety of moments of the sample wage distributions of movers and stayers are presented in Table
401.
Using the result from Proposition 9, the positive mean wage change among the group of
stayers implies that the minimum wage change had a positive welfare eﬀect in the population. Of
course, this interpretation relies heavily on the stationarity assumptions of the model, which are
highly questionable particularly given the youth of the sample. However, it is interesting to note
that the mean wage change is greater for stayers than for movers, a result not always found in
research on mobility and wage determination.17 As was discussed in Section 3.3, if the welfare of
individuals did increase after the minimum wage change, the mean wage diﬀerence of the movers
could be of any sign, so the fact that it is positive but smaller than that of the stayers is not
particularly informative for our purposes.
Though the positive sign of the mean wage change for the reference group is positive, the
size of the increase is not consistent with the implication of the model that is given in Corollary
12. The increase of approximately 1 dollar in the mean wage of job stayers is over 250 percent
greater than the upper bound on the change implied by the model.
Not surprisingly, the implication of Corollary 10 [i.e., no variance in wage changes among
stayers] is clearly refuted. The standard deviation of wage diﬀerences in the subsample of stayers
is 2.617 as opposed to its theoretical value of 0. Nonetheless, the variance of wage diﬀerences
among movers is far less than it is among stayers [where it is 5.011], which is consistent with my
theoretical analysis. The main reason for the large diﬀerence is the correlation between 1997 and
1998 wage rates. In the sample of movers this correlation is only .279 whereas in the sample of
17To generalize, researchers using U.S. data often ﬁnd that wage growth is greatest for “voluntary” movers and
smallest for “involuntary” movers, with stayers having intermediate levels of wage growth. Since we would suspect
that the subsample of movers contains a large proportion who move “voluntarily,” there is no reason to expect
this empirical result on the basis of a model of eﬃcient separations. See Flinn (1986,1997) for example, for further
discussion of these issues.
41stayers it is .752.
Though the stationarity assumptions underlying this analysis are surely suspect, a
cautious conclusion is that the results are not inconsistent with the minimum wage change of
September 1997 having had a beneﬁcial eﬀect on all labor market participants in this age range.
It is the case, however, that the distribution of wage changes fails to satisfy two of the strong
predictions of the model.
6. C
	
While it is tempting to infer the welfare eﬀects of minimum wage changes from empirical
observations on pre- and post-change wage distributions, in this exercise I have attempted to
point out the hazards of doing so. I have focused on wage distributions in this paper, but this
statement applies with equal force to the case in which the lack of change in employment levels
following a minimum wage increase is taken to imply welfare increases. The welfare criterion
employed in this paper, which is motivated by a simple equilibrium matching and bargaining
model, reﬂects both employment probability and wage distribution eﬀects of minimum wage
changes and hence is preferable to any measure which takes into account only employment or
wage information. Although the value of the welfare measure we have chosen is open to question,
we would argue that whatever measure is ﬁnally chosen, a formal model of the labor market is
required to meaningfully interpret minimum wage impacts on labor market outcomes.
The small empirical application I have presented usefully summarizes the general points I
wish to make. First, the fact that the wage oﬀer distribution in 1998 ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates the 1997 wage oﬀer distribution does not necessarily imply an increase in welfare.
Second, while I found no evidence of spillover resulting from the minimum wage increase of
September 1997, within the context of my model this could only be taken to imply that there
42were no welfare eﬀects of the minimum wage increase if the matching distribution satisﬁed
condition 2 of Proposition 6. To determine if this is the case requires that speciﬁc tests be
conducted using information from the wage distribution above the minimum or that the
equilibrium model be directly estimated and tested. Third, I showed that the direction of wage
changes for individuals who worked at the same job both before and after the minimum wage
change and who were paid more than the relevant minimum wage in each period was consistent
with welfare gains under the assumptions of my model. Using such data is perhaps the most
straightforward way to assess the direction of welfare eﬀects, but ideally one would like to adapt
such a procedure to allow for limited forms of nonstationarity and population heterogeneity.
Fourth, I have demonstrated that employment rate declines are perfectly consistent with increases
in welfare. Finally, I have shown that the existence of spillover eﬀects does not imply that a given
minimum wage change was beneﬁcial. Spillover can be good or bad, and can only be judged as
beneﬁcial within a particular model of the labor market.
43Table 1
Selected Sample Moments




w2 − w1 1.015 .606
ˆ σ1 3.298 4.743
ˆ σ2 3.941 3.411
ˆ σ1,2 9.774 4.514
ˆ ρ .752 .279
ˆ σw2−w1 2.617 5.011
N 92 153
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